@mattblaze

Doing an election canvas at scale does require expertise, and machine counts, but some hand counting of a subset of the ballots (to validate the machine count) should be a part of every election. And selecting people at random for that low-skill task wouldn't be a bad thing. It would create a group of ordinary citizens who've seen with their own eyes that the count was fair, which could help counter the anti-democracy propaganda.

@mattblaze

"Stupid" is a bit harsh.

Obviously we can't lock all American voters into a room while we count their votes, and that's not the lesson I suggest drawing from the Schneier piece.

Paper ballots are a Good Thing, because they can be recounted by hand. That could be part of a minimal standard for fair elections.

@mattblaze

The papal election is surprisingly secure, and I imagine we could take some lessons from it.

For example, the people who count the votes are selected at random, so it's almost impossible to bribe the vote counters.

How Secure Is the Papal Election? - Schneier on Security

Spanish translation Portuguese translation As the College of Cardinals prepares to elect a new pope, security people like me wonder about the process. How does it work, and just how hard would it be to hack the vote? The rules for papal elections are steeped in tradition. John Paul II last codified them in 1996, and Benedict XVI left the rules largely untouched. The “Universi Dominici Gregis on the Vacancy of the Apostolic See and the Election of the Roman Pontiff” is surprisingly detailed. Every cardinal younger than 80 is eligible to vote. We expect 117 ...

Schneier on Security (www.schneier.com)